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AGAINST LGBT EXCEPTIONALISM IN
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM
ANTIDISCRIMINATION OBLIGATIONS
CARLOS A. BALL*
Nelson Tebbe’s Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is
a wonderful book.1 At a time when our country seems so
polarized on so many social issues, it is a breath of fresh air to
read a book that so thoughtfully grapples with the question of
how best to protect religious freedom in our current age of
equality.
Whether or not one agrees with Tebbe on
methodological, policy, or normative questions, it is clear that he
takes both religious freedom and egalitarian values seriously.
Many of us in the legal academy who write on these issues tend
to be on one side or the other of that divide, but Tebbe straddles
the line, and he does so beautifully and effectively in this book.
Not only does he take the arguments of both sides seriously, but
even more importantly, I think both sides have until now taken
Tebbe’s scholarship on the intersection of religious freedom and
egalitarian values seriously, and that will only deepen with the
publication of this book.2 This is a major contribution to the
literature that will be discussed and analyzed for years to come.
There are many specific aspects of the book that merit
praise.
For example, Tebbe deserves credit for grappling
extensively with the question of third-party harms. As Tebbe

*Distinguished

Professor of Law and Judge Frederick Lacey Scholar, Rutgers Law School.
I elaborate on several of the points that I make in this essay in CARLOS A. BALL, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY (2017).
1 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017).
2 See generally Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 363 (2015) (noting examples of Tebbe’s earlier scholarship on the intersection of
religious freedom and egalitarian values); Paul Horwitz & Nelson Tebbe, Religious
Institutionalism—Why Now?, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 207 (Micah
Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016); Nelson Tebbe, Religious Accommodation in the Age of
Civil Rights: Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 25 (2015).
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explains, the avoidance of significant third-party harms must be
an essential component of determining the proper scope of
religious exemptions, whether constitutionally mandated or
legislatively determined, in order to make sure that the
government is not in a position of imposing significant costs on
some resulting from the religious exercise by others.3 The
question of third-party harms arising from religious exemptions
has not traditionally received much attention from either courts
or commentators, in part because many of the exemptions at
issue in the past, such as those involving the smoking of peyote
for religious reasons (e.g., Employment Division v. Smith)4 or
waivers from compulsory education requirements (e.g., Wisconsin
v. Yoder),5 did not impose significant harms on identifiable third
parties. The same cannot be said, as Tebbe persuasively argues,
about the exemption at issue in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc.6
The fact that the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby interpreted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act to require that a
contraception exemption be granted to closely-held corporations
controlled by religious owners made it significantly more difficult
for large numbers of women (composed of the corporations’
female employees and the female dependents of employees) to
have access to contraceptives in the months following the ruling.7
This makes the exemption at issue in Hobby Lobby much more
problematic than the exemptions at issue in Smith and Yoder. I
agree with Tebbe that it is essential to keep questions of thirdparty harms in mind when considering the proper scope of
religious exemptions from LGBT antidiscrimination laws.8
3 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 52-54.
4 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that denying unemployment

compensation to persons who had used peyote for sacramental purposes did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause).
5 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin’s compulsory
school-attendance laws unduly burdened the Free Exercise Clause rights of Amish
parents).
6 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
7 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 51.
8 I discuss the issue of third-party harms and religious exemptions in CARLOS A. BALL,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY 266-70 (2017) and
Carlos A. Ball, Sexuality, Third-Party Harms, and the “Live-and-Let-Live” Approach to
Religious Exemptions, LAW, CULTURE & HUMANITIES, Aug. 24, 2015, at 1. For other
writings on the question of third-party harms and religious exemptions, see, e.g.,
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the

BALL (2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/23/2018 10:48 AM

2018 AGAINST LGBT EXEPTIONALISM FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION

235

Tebbe’s treatment of the crucial third-party harm question is just
one of the many ways in which he rigorously and thoughtfully
grapples with the intersection of equality and religious freedom
in the book.
Traditionally, participants in book symposia such as this
one praise first and criticize second. The latter part of this
equation is challenging for me because I essentially agree with
much of what Tebbe has to say in the book. However, I want to
make an overarching observation about the book, related to the
relative importance of historically-based judgments in Tebbe’s
project. I also want to suggest that, given his methodological
approach in the book, Tebbe is too quick to dismiss the analogy
between racial discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination in the context of religious exemptions.9
I am struck by the crucial—I could even say
determinative—role that past resolutions of conflicts involving
religious exemptions play in Tebbe’s approach to resolving
current controversies involving religious liberty on the one hand
and LGBT rights and reproductive freedom on the other. Tebbe’s
social coherence approach follows a two-part process in seeking to
resolve the contemporary controversies at issue.
First, it
analogizes from concrete, past controversies.10 Second, it
abstracts normative principles from past cases.11 Either way,
under the social coherence approach that Tebbe defends in the
book, participants in the debates, as he puts it, “are likely to rely
on commitments that they have come to trust.”12
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 343, 363-68 (2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible
Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause,
67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 52-56 (2014); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions,
Third-Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 137780 (2016).
9 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 131 (suggesting that when considering how to exempt
religious individuals from LGBT antidiscrimination laws in the context of marriage
equality, “it might be best to put the race analogy aside”).
10 Id. at 8 (explaining that the social coherence method calls for comparing “a new
scenario . . . to familiar situations and to conclusions they have drawn about them after
careful consideration”).
11 Id. at 8-9 (explaining that the social coherence method also relies on “principles,
meaning tenets . . . abstracted from particular cases [that are then applied] to the new
situation”).
12 Id. at 9.
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In my estimation, Tebbe is correct that contested legal and
policy questions arising from the intersection of religious freedom
and equality principles demand difficult normative work. But,
after reading the book, I am not sure he realizes the extent to
which his social coherence approach is historically driven.
Whether through analogies from concrete, past cases or by
abstracting normative principles from past cases, Tebbe is
essentially looking at how the country has, in the past,
accommodated religious freedom in the pursuit of other
objectives to guide us through current religious liberty
controversies involving LGBT rights and reproductive freedom.
I think Tebbe does a wonderful job in abstracting
compelling and normatively defensible principles from the
nation’s past experiences with religious exemptions, including
the importance of avoiding significant third-party harms. At its
core, I understand Tebbe’s project to be one of historicallygrounded judgments, many of which are imbued with normative
principles. It seems clear from the book that Tebbe thinks his
project is more normative than historical.13 But I think the
project’s normativity is inextricably linked to its historical
methodology.
It is easy to overlook (or forget)—as our society grapples, in
particular, with contemporary controversies pitting LGBT
equality against the rights of speech, association, and to the free
exercise of religion of those who oppose that equality—that our
nation through the decades has repeatedly dealt with difficult
questions related to how best to balance the equality rights of
some against the liberty interests of others.
Indeed, the
contemporary disputes over the proper scope of the state’s
authority to promote LGBT equality in the face of liberty-based
objections are only the latest iterations of a continuing debate in
American law and policy over the reach of antidiscrimination
laws.
In my view, a policy setting approach in this area that
looks to history for guidance is the correct one, which is
essentially why I agree with much of what Tebbe has to say in
13 See id. at 8-9 (describing the social coherence approach as calling for the reaching
of judgments and the application of principles).
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the book. In contrast, it seems to me that behind the call for
expansive religious exemptions in the context of LGBT equality
that go beyond the scope of past religious accommodations is the
notion of “same-sex marriage exceptionalism,” that is the
contention that marriage equality presents us with novel
questions about the intersection of religious freedom and the
scope of antidiscrimination laws that demand new forms of
religious exemptions from the application of antidiscrimination
laws—such as, for example, immunity from the application of
antidiscrimination laws benefitting for-profit corporations and
government employees.
I believe we should reject the notion of LGBT rights
exceptionalism, including that which is applicable to marriage
equality issues.
It is true that the particulars of the
contemporary debates over the intersection of LGBT rights and
liberty claims are relatively new; the tension between equality
and liberty in the context of LGBT rights could not arise when
there were no legal protections for sexual minorities. Sexual
orientation antidiscrimination laws are of relatively recent
vintage, and therefore the conflict between religious liberty and
LGBT equality is also of relatively recent vintage. But even if
the particulars are relatively new, the broader question of how to
enforce antidiscrimination laws while accommodating libertybased interests is an old and recurring one in American history.
Our country has grappled with the liberty-based limits to the
application of antidiscrimination laws at many different times,
including during the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1875;14
during the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;15 during
the controversy, in the early 1980s, involving the question of
whether particular religious educational institutions were
entitled to tax breaks despite their race-based policies;16 during
the 1980s and 1990s, as the courts grappled with the application
of gender antidiscrimination laws to all-male organizations;17
14
15
16
17

See BALL, supra note 8, at 156-60.
See id. at 169-171, 173-74, 179.
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579 (1983).
See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 4 (1988); Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 539 (1987); Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984).
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and during the last forty years as the courts have developed and
implemented the constitutionally-based ministerial exception to
antidiscrimination laws.18
Given the country’s extensive experience grappling with
the proper contours of liberty-based limits—including those
grounded in religious freedom—to the application of
antidiscrimination laws, there is no need, in my view, for new
and expansive accommodations that depart significantly from the
ways in which the nation has in the past accommodated liberty
considerations while seeking to attain equality objectives in the
context of race and gender.
I recognize that there is a certain irony in the fact that an
LGBT egalitarian such as myself is calling for the use of history
as a guide for the resolution of current LGBT controversies given
that it has been LGBT rights opponents, of course, who have
repeatedly relied on historical traditions and practices to deny
LGBT equality claims, including those related to marriage. But
that history has been one of male and heterosexual privilege and
exclusion. That is a history, in other words, that is morally
suspect.
But the history of how American antidiscrimination law
has sought to accommodate religious liberty is not normatively
suspect. In fact, I think our country has reached time-tested,
reasonable, and workable compromises arising from the
intersection of race and gender equality, on the one hand, and
religious freedom, on the other hand; generally speaking, how the
nation’s laws have accommodated religious freedom in the
pursuit of racial and gender equality has worked well for all
sides.
Well-established exemptions, such as the ministerial
exemption and the religious exemptions to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, have provided important protections to
religious groups by allowing them, in some contexts, to pursue
their spiritual missions without having to abide by

18 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 176-77 (2012); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1999); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1972).
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antidiscrimination obligations applicable to other entities.19 At
the same time, the well-established religious exemptions have
not interfered, to any significant degree, with the ability of
antidiscrimination laws to achieve their objectives. The ways in
which our country, through the decades, has balanced the
pursuit of equality for marginalized groups against the religious
freedom rights of equality opponents constitute time-tested,
reasonable, and workable compromises that we should use as
guides in addressing contemporary disputes arising from the
tension between the attainment of LGBT equality and the
protection of religious freedom.
At the end of the day, there is no good reason, in the
context of LGBT issues, to depart in significant ways from how
anti-discrimination law has in the past accommodated religious
dissenters in the context of race and gender. I am therefore not
so quick, as Tebbe does in his book, to put the race analogy aside
in grappling with the question of how broad religious exemptions
should be in the area of sexual orientation equality.20
Supporters of expansive religious exemptions in the
context of LGBT rights often take offense when egalitarians
argue that religious exemptions in the context of sexual
orientation should not be significantly broader than those in the
context of race—race is different, they insist, because essentially
all religious actors who believe it is proper to make racial
distinctions always act in bad faith (i.e., they are racists).21 On

19 For the Supreme Court’s elucidation of the ministerial exception, see HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89. The religious exemptions to Title VII are found in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-1(a) (“This title shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”) and in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(e)(2) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university,
or other educational institution . . . to hire and employ employees of a particular religion
if such . . . institution . . . is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled,
or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or
society . . . .”).
20 See TEBBE, supra note 1, at 131.
21 For example, Thomas Berg argues that those who, in earlier times, dissented on
religious grounds “from basic racial equality . . . showed an intransigence that bespoke a
permanent dismissal of African-Americans as full humans.” Thomas C. Berg, What SameSex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
206, 235 (2010).

BALL (2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

240

5/23/2018 10:48 AM

JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Vol. 31.2

the other hand, it is argued, many of those who, on conscience
grounds, believe it is proper to make distinctions on the basis of
sexual orientation, in particular when it comes to marriage, act
in good faith (i.e., they are not homophobic).22 Another variation
of this argument is that while reasonable people can still
disagree on the appropriateness of same-sex marriage bans, no
reasonable person can disagree on the appropriateness of antimiscegenation laws. This is essentially Kent Greenawalt’s
argument for treating religious exemptions differently in the
context of the legal recognition of interracial marriages than
similar exemptions in the context of same-sex marriages, a
contention that Tebbe notes in his book.23
The problem with these efforts to distinguish between
religious dissent from LGBT equality and religious dissent from
racial equality is that they contain unavoidable assessments of
the reasonableness of the two sets of religious views. It seems to
me that efforts to distinguish religious-based objections to LGBT
equality from religious-based objections to race equality—in
22 It is argued that religious dissenters from marriage equality act in good faith
because “[t]here is a serious debate about the relationship of sexuality and procreation to
marriage, and about the relevance of the ‘centuries of tradition—of accumulated social
knowledge—which the world’s great religions embody’ and which almost uniformly has
treated marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman.” Id. (quoting JONATHAN
RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR
AMERICA 165 (2004)). For her part, Robin Fretwell Wilson claims that
[w]hile the parallels between racial discrimination and discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation should not be dismissed, it is not clear that the two
are equivalent in this context. The religious and moral convictions that motivate
objectors to refuse to facilitate same-sex marriage simply cannot be marshaled to
justify racial discrimination.
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 77, 101 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson
eds., 2008). It is also contended that “[s]ometimes the[] refusals of service [to LGBT
people] may be an act of bigotry or social protest, but very often, the claim to feel personal
moral responsibility, or even fear of divine punishment, will be in complete good faith.”
Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 189, 195 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson
eds., 2008).
23 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 131. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims
of Conscience, 28 J.L. & POL. 91, 114 (2013) (arguing that, unlike with interracial
marriage bans, there is still no consensus on the unreasonableness of same-sex marriage
bans, and that therefore “it will take some time before that perspective is shared by the
vast majority of citizens and is no longer a subject on which people are seriously divided.
[As a result], some accommodation may properly be given in the meantime for those not
yet able to perceive the moral truth of the matter”).
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order to justify broader religious exemptions in the sexuality
context—fail from the beginning because they are grounded in
the notion that some religious views are more reasonable than
others. Even if exemption proponents are correct in their belief
that many religious opponents of LGBT equality act in good
faith, it is extremely problematic to set policies, including
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws, on
ostensible distinctions between reasonable and unreasonable
religious views.24
Indeed, it is difficult for outsiders to determine the degree
of good faith with which individuals assert religious claims. Such
a determination usually requires intrusive inquiries into the
nature of and justifications for particular religious values,
inquiries made even more problematic by the fact that religious
beliefs are by their nature grounded in considerations of faith
rather than in those of reason.
As a result, courts are
appropriately hesitant to scrutinize either the sincerity of
religious litigants or the reasonableness of their views.25
In short, unlike Tebbe, I do not think we should put the
race analogy aside when determining the proper scope of
religious exemptions from LGBT equality measures. Instead, the
burden should be on those who want to treat LGBT equality
differently from racial (or gender) equality when it comes to
religious exemptions to explain why that differential treatment is
justified, and claims based on the good faith of those who object

24 See generally Carlos A. Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC L. REV.
639 (2016) (where I further explore questions related to good faith and bigotry in samesex marriage debates).
25 For example, although the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University rejected the
university’s contention that its religious-based understandings of racial equality
precluded the government from withdrawing tax benefits because of the institution’s racebased policies, it accepted the proposition that the university had “a genuine belief that
the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage.” Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 602 n.28 (1983); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (“The
religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to
most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding
their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.
When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.”). As Ira Lupu
notes, “the inquiry into sincerity cannot completely escape the distinctly bad aroma of an
inquisition. The decisionmaker can rarely be morally certain that the claimant is
not sincere in his professed religious commitments.” Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 954 (1989).
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to the application of LGBT equality mandates on religious
grounds simply do not cut it.
It bears emphasizing that to argue in favor of treating
religious exemptions from sexual orientation antidiscrimination
obligations in generally similar ways as our country’s laws have
treated religious exemptions in the context of race and gender
antidiscrimination obligations is not to argue in favor of
absolutist egalitarian positions in these matters.
As
demonstrated by our nation’s historical treatment of religious
liberty as it impacts the pursuit of racial and gender equality, the
question is not whether exemptions should be provided; instead,
the question is the extent of their scope.
In reviewing that history elsewhere, I have identified five
characteristics of the ways in which American antidiscrimination
law, before the advent of same-sex marriage, sought to
accommodate religious dissent while pursuing equality
objectives.
First, the exemptions have granted religious organizations
some accommodations from antidiscrimination obligations that
go beyond what is constitutionally required.
Second, the
exemptions have generally distinguished between the discretion
of religious organizations to make distinctions on the basis of
religion and their ability to take other protected traits, such as
race and gender, into account. Third, the exemptions have
applied to a broad category of religious organizations, not just to
houses of worship. Fourth, the exemptions have been limited to
nonprofit religious organizations [and thus have not been made
available to for-profit entities]. Finally, the exemptions have not
allowed government officials to decide which members of the
public to serve based on the officials’ religious views.26
Policymakers and citizens, in assessing contemporary
controversies over the state’s authority to promote LGBT
equality, should look to these traditional ways in which American
antidiscrimination law has sought to balance equality and
religious freedom.27 It is true, of course, that the mere fact that
American antidiscrimination law has traditionally granted
26 BALL, supra note 8, at 251.
27 See id. at 263.
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religious accommodations that go beyond what is constitutionally
required; distinguished between the ability to hire coreligionists
and the discretion to take other protected traits into account;
allowed a broad category of religious organizations to benefit
from exemptions and not just houses of worship; limited the
beneficiaries of those accommodations to nonprofit entities; and
refused to exempt religious government employees from
antidiscrimination obligations does not conclusively establish, as
a normative matter, that the same should apply to religious
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws in all circumstances,
including those involving sexual minorities.28 Nevertheless, these
time-tested characteristics of exemptions from antidiscrimination
obligations create a strong presumption that they should be
followed in determining the scope of exemptions in matters
related to LGBT rights.
This means that if a proponent of LGBT equality contends
that
religious
exemptions
from
sexual
orientation
antidiscrimination laws should be narrower than the exemptions
that legislatures have granted religious dissenters in the past in
matters related to race and gender—for example, by not
extending exemptions beyond those that are constitutionally
required or by limiting the beneficiaries of those exemptions to
houses of worship, to the exclusion of other types of religious
organizations—the proponent should have the burden of showing
why LGBT equality should be treated differently from other
forms of equality.29
Similarly, if an opponent of LGBT equality contends that
religious exemptions from sexual orientation antidiscrimination
laws should be broader than the exemptions that legislatures
have granted religious dissenters in the past in matters related
to race and gender—for example, by making religious exemptions
available to for-profit entities or to government employees—the
burden should be on the opponent to show why LGBT equality
should be treated differently from other forms of equality.30 As
Alan Brownstein aptly puts it, “the contention that religious
28 See id. at 263-64.
29 See id. at 264.
30 See id.
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objectors to same-sex marriage must receive special
accommodations beyond those that would be provided to others
in
comparable
circumstances
raises
questions
about
preferentialism and equity that need to be addressed and
resolved.”31 In short, if there is going to be LGBT rights
exceptionalism when it comes to the scope of religious
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws, the burden should be
on proponents of that exceptionalism to establish why it is
required.32
The clash between equality and liberty is a recurring issue
in the history of American antidiscrimination law, rendering the
ongoing debates over the intersection of LGBT equality and
religious freedom neither exceptional nor surprising.
The
nation’s history shows that it has been possible in the past to
reach workable compromises between the pursuit of equality for
marginalized groups and the protection of important liberty
interests enjoyed by opponents of that equality.
Any such compromise, whether legislatively crafted (as in
Title VII) or judicially mandated (as in the ministerial exception),
can be criticized for being too narrow or too broad. Nonetheless,
the generally reasonable compromises that legislatures and
courts have implemented in this area have had two distinct
benefits. First, they have helped to calm the waters, so to speak,
by reducing the social and political conflict that accompanies the
initial, and seemingly inevitable, clash between equality and
liberty in the application of American antidiscrimination law.
Second, most of the compromises have provided important
protections to religious organizations without significantly
interfering with the government’s efforts to eradicate racial and
gender discrimination.33 This historical record provides grounds
for optimism that the nation will be able to reach reasonable and
workable compromises on how best to balance equality and
liberty in the context of LGBT rights that, although not
31 Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for
Reciprocal Accommodations of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to
Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389, 410 (2010).
32 See BALL, supra note 8, at 264.
33 See id. at 178-80 (discussing the compromise that led to the final language of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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satisfying the concerns of advocates on all sides, end up being
generally accepted as fair and appropriate.
I agree with Chad Flanders when he emphasizes, in his
contribution to this symposium, the normative and pragmatic
importance of compromise in this area of law and policy.34 Of
course, to emphasize the importance of compromise is not to
endorse the merits of any particular compromise. However, I
agree that, as a general matter, participants on both sides of
contemporary debates over the extent to which considerations of
religious liberty should limit the scope of LGBT equality
measures would be well served by engaging in those debates in
the spirit of compromise.
At the same time, the determination of which compromises
are ultimately unacceptable to each side because they violate
first principles requires unavoidable reliance on normative
assessments and judgments. Tebbe is therefore undoubtedly
correct that the resolution of difficult normative questions is an
indispensable component of determining how to resolve ongoing
controversies implicating the intersection of religious freedom
and egalitarian values.
At the same time, as Tebbe’s
methodology also shows, the question of what constitute
reasonable resolutions to contemporary clashes between religious
liberty and the pursuit of egalitarian objectives can and should
be guided by defensible normative principles that emerge from
how our country has attempted to resolve those clashes in the
past. In other words, there is no need to reinvent the exemption
wheel. The bottom line is this: we should be suspicious of the
contention that the push for LGBT rights, in particular as it
relates to marriage equality, constitutes a unique threat to
religious liberty that requires significant departures from the
ways in which American antidiscrimination law has
accommodated religious liberty in the past.

34 Chad Flanders, In (Partial) Praise of (Some) Compromise: Comments on Tebbe, __
J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2, 13-15) (on file with the Journal
of Civil Rights and Economic Development).

